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Abstract 
This paper has two major objectives; the first objective is to shed light on the dilemma concerning the debate on 
corporate governance definition, whereas the second objective is to identify the major causes for calls to improve 
corporate governance. The last three decades has witnessed exponential increase in corporate governance 
awareness, corporate governance regulations, and a drive for improved corporate governance in addition to an 
interesting debate on the definition of corporate governance. 
Concerning the debate on the definition of corporate governance the extant literature revealed that there is 
significant disagreement among researchers on a single definition for corporate governance. On one extreme 
some corporate governance definitions are considered too narrow due to their limited focus on protection of 
shareholders’ wealth while disregarding the interest of other stakeholders. On the other some have been criticized 
for being too board as a result focusing on too many stakeholders without paying attention to the sole reason for 
the firm existence which is the maximization of shareholders wealth.  
The authors view corporate governance as a set of mechanisms aimed at mitigating the negative impact of 
agency conflict. This view focuses on resolving the main issue of corporate governance, which is the conflict of 
the interests between owners of the firm and executive management. Therefore the authors strongly argue that 
mitigating this conflict of interest is of special benefit to the firm, the stakeholders’ and the economy as a whole 
and hence any definition for corporate governance should encompass the agency conflict. 
In relation to the second objective based on the review of the relevant literature, five reasons have been identified 
as the major causes for calls to improve corporate governance. These causes are a) increase in firm size and 
complexity, b) separation of ownership and management, c) exponential growth of capital markets, d) increase in 
fraud cases and financial crises and, e) increased awareness of corporate governance impact on firm financial 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has come to the forefront of knowledge as a distinct and expanding field of study (Parker, 
2014) and gained momentum as a result of the infamous corporate fraud cases that occurred during the last three 
decades, such as the case of Enron and World Com in the USA. In addition, the recent financial crises in 2008 
have further emphasized the impact of poor corporate governance on firms’ performance and the repercussion of 
that on countries’ economic growth as well. The last three decades has witnessed exponential increase in 
corporate governance awareness, corporate governance regulation and a drive for improved corporate 
governance. Five reasons have been identified as the major causes for calls to improve corporate governance. 
This paper is organized in four sections, following this introduction, is section two which reviews and evaluates 
critically the debate on the definition for corporate governance, followed by section three which identifies and 
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discusses the major causes for calls for improved corporate governance and the final section is section four 
which concludes, summarizes and gives recommendations for future research. 
 
2. Definition of Corporate Governance  
The purpose of this section is to highlight the debate on the definition of corporate governance. The extant 
literature revealed that there is no agreement among researchers and organizations on a single definition for 
Corporate Governance. Corporate governance definitions differ based on the perspectives and the varying 
outlooks and exposure of researchers (Armstrong and Sweeney, 2002). Some definitions have been criticized as 
being too narrow while others have been criticized as broad (Ntim, 2009). A definition is classified as broad if it 
focuses on all stakeholders’ protection without defining who these stake holders are, and it is classified as narrow 
if it focuses on shareholders’ interest maximization while disregarding or ignoring other stakeholders’ interests.  
The most widely used definition is the Cadbury Report definition, where it defines corporate governance as how 
companies are managed and controlled (Arifin et al., 2014; Cadbury et al., 1992). This definition highlights the 
need for good management and good control without getting into the dilemma of being pro maximization of 
shareholders’ interests or pro protection of stakeholders. 
In (2001) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined corporate governance 
as a system governing the relationship between executive management and shareholders. This definition seems 
very broad.  In 2010 the Organization OECD offered a more comprehensive definition that defines Corporate 
Governance “as a set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way a corporation is 
directed, administered or controlled”. Both OECD definitions focus on managing and controlling the relationship 
between corporate managers and equity owners in order to mitigate the negative impact of the agency conflict. 
According to (Velnampy, 2013) corporate governance is concerned with ways in which all stakeholders 
implement mechanisms to protect their interests. Velnampy definition is considered too broad because of the 
infinite number of stakeholders involved. According to (Rezaee, 2008) corporate governance can be defined as 
“a process through which shareholders induce management to act in their interest, providing a degree of 
confidence that is necessary for capital markets to function effectively”. Rezaee (2008) definition heavily draws 
from agency theory and emphasizes on the need to induce management, probably to arrive at some goal 
congruence where executive management’s interests are aligned to the interests of shareholders. 
In March 2003 the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council published corporate 
governance guidance for Australia where Corporate Governance is defined as “the system by which companies 
are directed and managed and the risk is controlled". This definition is most comprehensive since it includes the 
risk involved as part of the definition of corporate governance. 
In light of the above it is apparent that there is significant disagreement among researchers and institutions 
concerning the definition of corporate governance; such diversity is caused by the ever expanding scope of the 
subject of Corporate Governance itself and on whether executive management is responsible to maximizing 
owners’ equity or to also protect and maximize the interest of other stakeholders’, including employees, 
community, banks, etc., Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) argue that companies’ objective is maximization of 
owners’ wealth whereas Donaldson et al. (1983) and Freeman and McVea (2001) argue that firms are responsible 
to all stakeholders not only to their shareholders. Mc Vea’s argument highlights the need to realign companies’ 
objectives to those of shareholders in order to strike a balance between shareholders’ wealth maximization and 
their responsibility to other stakeholders. Accordingly to this argument the definition for corporate governance 
should incorporate both shareholders’ wealth maximization and the firm responsibility to other stakeholders. 
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However the researchers view corporate governance as a set of mechanisms imposed by regulators, companies’ 
boards and shareholders so that the negative impact of agency conflict can be mitigated. This view place more 
emphasis on solving the main issue in corporate governance that is the conflict of interests between firm owners 
and executive management which lead to the cases of fraud and other cases of abuse of power. 
 
3. The Causes for calls for Improved Corporate Governance 
The first two decades of the third millennia are witnessing exponential increase in corporate governance 
awareness, corporate governance regulations and a drive for improved corporate governance(Black et al., 2014; 
Fox, 2014). Five reasons can be identified as the major causes for calls to improve corporate governance. Figure 
1 provides a summary of the major causes for calls for improved governance. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Major Causes for Calls to Improve Corporate Governance 
 
The first and premier reason for the increased calls for improved corporate governance is the separation of 
ownership and management. According to (Berle and Means, 1932) separating ownership from control creates 
incongruence between the goals of managers and that of owners, therefore sometimes managers do divert from 
corporate goals in order to achieve their own personal goals. 
The second reason that has been identified is that business entities are becoming more global and more complex 
due to the increase of the size and number of multinational firms. Firms become more complex (Poschke, 2014) 
because they work in different cultures, exposed to more risks and operated by professional management teams 
who are not owners. These changing and evolving conditions have created the need for improved corporate 
governance in order to protect firm owners and other stakeholders from abuse by professional management. 
Increase in firm complexity due to extensive spatial and or line of business diversification limits transparency 
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hence it increases the demand for corporate governance (Bushman et al., 2004). 
The third reason for improved corporate governance regulations is the unparalleled growth of capital markets in 
developed, developing and emerging markets. This tremendous growth in capital market growth need to be 
coupled by stringent, governance framework that guarantee competency of boards and boards accountability in 
order to mitigate the impact of agency conflict which may lead to abuses by senior management and 
consequently capital market collapse. Capital markets crash that happened in 2008 caused the whole world 
economy to collapse and lead to worldwide economic crises. The financial crisis that hit the South East Asian 
countries economies in 1997 was partially due to inefficient governance systems, including poor reporting 
practice (Becht et al., 2003, 2011; Furman et al., 1998). All these crises had been linked to poor corporate 
governance in a way or another. 
The fourth and the major reason that gave corporate governance momentum is increase in fraud and bankruptcy 
cases. Fraud and loose governance is considered number one cause  for financial (Jelal and Mbohwa, 2014) 
regulations such as Sarbanes Oxley  (2002) in the USA and the recommendations of the Cadbury committee in 
the United Kingdom (UK) which both call for more stringent corporate governance regulations are the direct 
result of reactions to corporate fraud cases. 
The fifth reason is the increase in awareness of corporate governance impact on firms’ performance. 
Governments and firms tend to adhere to best practice in corporate governance as they become more aware of 
the nexus firm performance and the repercussions of poor corporate governance. O'Regan and Oster (2005) 
argue that poor corporate performance and stakeholders’ dissatisfaction are direct result of poor corporate 
governance. “Good governance is now accepted as vital to achieving the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals and as a pre-requisite for sustainable economic growth”(Oman and Blume, 2005). 
 
4. Conclusion and recommendation for further research 
Awareness campaigns lead by the Organization for Economic Development OECD, other regulatory bodies and 
governments in 1990s have resulted in the introduction and adoption of the OECD principles(Governance, 2004) 
for corporate governance by both developed, developing and emerging markets and the introduction of corporate 
governance codes and a debate on corporate governance definition. 
This paper based on the review of the extant literature. Significant disagreement on the definition of corporate 
governance was found and five causes for calls for improved governance are identified. The authors view 
corporate governance as a set of mechanisms aimed at mitigating the negative impact of agency conflict. This 
view focuses on resolving the conflict of the interest between owners of the firm and executive management. 
This view came from the authors believe  that mitigating this conflict of interest provide substantial benefits to 
the firm, the stakeholders’ and the economy as a whole.  
With regard to the studies second objective the study identified five major reasons the researchers believe to be 
the major causes for the increased attention given to improved corporate governance, by international 
organizations, by governments, by financial institutions and by academic researchers. 
The researchers recommend that future research examine the impact of these causes on corporate governance 
development at both firm level and country level.  
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